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1DOES COMMUNITY AND ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSIBILITY AFFECT FIRM RISK? 
EVIDENCE FROM UK PANEL DATA 1994-2006
ABSTRACT
The question of how an individual firm’s environmental performance impacts its firm risk has not 
been examined in any empirical UK research. Does a company that strives to attain good 
environmental performance decreases its market risk or is environmental performance just a 
disadvantageous cost that increases such risk levels for these firms? Answers to this question have 
important implications for the management of companies and the investment decisions of 
individuals and institutions. The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between 
corporate environmental performance and firm risk in the British context. Using the largest dataset 
so far assembled, with Community and Environmental Responsibility (CER) rankings for all rated 
UK companies between 1994 and 2006, we show that a company’s environmental performance is 
inversely related to its systematic financial risk. However, an increase of 1.0 in the CER score is
associated with only a 0.02 reduction in firm’s risk and cost of capital. 
2INTRODUCTION
Recent conclusions on the effects of human activity on the earth’s climate (Stern, 2006, IPCC, 
2007) have pushed the community and environmental responsibility (CER) of corporations up the 
policy agenda. As a consequence, the issue of economic performance and its association with 
investment in CER, has become more urgent. Comprehensive literature reviews, for example, Pava 
and Krausz, 1996; Margolis and Walsh, 2001; Orlitzky, Schmidt, and Rynes 2003, suggest that 
CER is supportive of competitive advantage, and that therefore corporate managements at least are 
likely to be increasingly supportive of such investments. 
As far as shareholder returns are concerned, there is no consensus as to whether such 
investments have a favourable or detrimental impact on returns (Brammer, Brooks and Pavelin, 
2006, p.97). Indeed recent evidence suggests that corporate social responsibility is expected to be 
costly to shareholders, (Surroca and Tribo, 2008), and that investors show weaker preferences for 
attributes such as social performance than for shorter term operational efficiency attributes (Cox et 
al, 2007). 
Although such investigations have been and remain important, it is also of value to consider 
an alternative but complementary avenue of research. Rather than representing cost and revenue 
trade-offs, investments in CER may also represent risk reduction opportunities or greater risk 
exposures. In particular, it is possible that firms that have made such investments might be more or 
less vulnerable to adverse shocks that systematically affect firms and that should accordingly be 
priced in a financial market. Examples might include firms that have invested in clean technology, 
insulation etc being less vulnerable to price increases in energy inputs, or conversely firms that have 
invested in premium priced products and processes, such as organic food and drink, being more 
vulnerable in a general economic downturn. These issues raise the question as to whether such risks 
are priced by stock markets and if so what is their net effect. The magnitude of these effects will 
potentially impact the overall level of utility in terms of the risk and return trade off for the average 
3investor. True economic performance, as Orlitzky and Benjamin (2001, p.369) point out, manifests 
itself in both high financial return and low financial risk. Moreover, as far as portfolio investors are 
concerned, differential risk effects may compound or attenuate the negative effects of screening that 
otherwise follow from research evidence suggesting neutrality in terms of return differentials 
(Brammer et al, 2006). 
A number of prior studies have attempted to quantify the empirical relationship between 
CER and market risk (beta). These are summarized in Orlitzky and Benjamin’s (2001, p.385) meta-
analysis, which finds an overall negative correlation. These studies utilise data from the US and 
cover papers published in the period 1978-1995. Many of these studies relied on small samples and 
all had fewer than 200 observations. To measure CER several of the studies use CEP data, and are 
thereby concerned only with pollution (Chen & Metcalf, 1980, Spicer, 1978, Pava & Krausz, 1995) 
or disclosure Trotman & Bradley (1981) Roberts (1992). Others used subjective indices for example 
a concern for society index Aupperle, Carroll, & Hatfield (1985), O’Neill Saunders, & McCarthy 
(1989). Other sundry measures are also used (Alexander & Buchholz, 1978; Baldwin et al. (1986), 
Fombrun & Shanley (1990). Only one, McGuire, Sundgren, & Schneeweis, 1988, used Fortune’s
responsibility to the community and environment ratings. The latter is a broad based and repeated 
measure, creating the possibility of a large sample panel survey. McGuire et al, whose research was 
conducted only shortly after the inception of the Fortune ranking could of necessity only access 
three years of data.
The purpose of this paper is to conduct a new empirical investigation of the CER and market 
risk relationship using a longer run data set. In doing so it aims to present evidence for the UK, 
based on a large panel data set. It uses a measure equivalent to the Fortune rankings as a proxy for 
CER and measures its impact on risk using a twelve year panel data set. Our research is also 
important since we use the largest dataset so far used, which has Community and Environmental 
Responsibility (CER) rankings for all rated UK companies between 1995 and 2006. In brief, the 
4results indicate that a company’s environmental performance is associated with lower systematic
risk. Specifically, an increase of 1.0 in the CER score is associated with only a 0.028 reduction in 
the firm’s beta factor. The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews prior 
research in order to evaluate the appropriate proxies for empirical testing and other variables of 
interest. Section 3 describes the research design and the empirical predictions. The main findings 
are then discussed in section 4. In the final section conclusions are drawn.
I THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES
Two main theoretical arguments have been used to examine the economic and risk consequences of 
corporate environmental responsibility (e.g. McGuire et al. 1988; Klassen and McLaughlin, 1996; 
McWilliams and Siegel, 2001). The first is the strict constructionism school which argues that high 
environmental responsibility results in additional operating costs and potential sacrifices (e.g. via 
promoting community development plans, establishing environmental protection procedures, and 
dropping certain product lines). Therefore, those firms that improve their environmental 
performance are at economic and, therefore, risk disadvantage. 
The second is the environmental responsibility school which argues that despite the potential 
significant costs of improving environmental performance, other costs are reduced or revenues are 
increased. On the cost side, companies who minimize the negative environmental impacts of their 
products and processes, recycle post-consumer waste, and establish environmental management 
systems reduce costs from materials waste, energy consumption and inefficient processes and 
prevent environmental spills, crises, liabilities, penalties and management time directed at clean-up 
and remediation. On the revenue side, the environmentally oriented companies are posited to attract 
customers and expand their markets or displace competitors that fail to promote strong 
environmental performance (Klassen and McLaughlin, 1996). From this perspective, it can be 
argued that if a firm acts in an environmentally responsible manner, then this firm will decrease its 
5market risk. This low risk makes projections of a firm’s future cash flows more certain and reliable 
(Orlitzky and Benjamin, 2001).
Supporting this argument is the stakeholder theory which contends that every modern 
corporation has explicit and implicit relationships (contracts) with a variety of primary and 
secondary stakeholders who have the power and/or an interest (stake) in its actions and outputs and, 
therefore, they are a critical factor in determining its success or failure (e.g. Jensen and Meckling, 
1976; Freeman, 1984; Cornell and Shapiro, 1987; Jones, 1995; Wijnberg, 2000). Consequently, 
managers, as agents monitored by multiple stakeholders, have a duty of balancing their 
stakeholders’ claims to safeguard the welfare of the corporation (Evan and Freeman, 1993).
This paper analyses the CER-market risk relation by relating it to the instrumental approach 
of stakeholder theory which establishes a general relation between proposed behaviour and 
expected outcome (Jones, 1995). As Donaldson and Preston (1995) explained, “If you want to 
achieve (avoid) results X, Y, or Z, then adopt (don’t adopt) principles and practices A, B, or C.” (p. 
72). Theoretically, if a firm does not act in an environmentally responsible manner and, therefore, 
fails to meet the claims of implicit stakeholders, investors may consider it as a risky investment 
because they may anticipate costly explicit claims (e.g. regulatory intervention, governmental fines 
and lawsuits) to force the firm to consider these claims. Also, investors may regard this as an 
evidence of poor management skills which may result in restricted ability to obtain capital at 
consistent rates (McGuire et al. 1988). 
II PRIOR RESEARCH ON THE EFFECTS OF CER FOR INVESTORS
Shareholders, government regulators, consumers, employees, and the general public are becoming 
increasingly interested in companies' environmental activities (Ilinitch et al. 1998). Part of this 
interest is motivated by the possibility of a positive relationship between CER and financial 
performance. For most, if not all of these stakeholders it is also likely to be motivated by some 
6perception of risk. In the case of shareholders, financial risk is likely to be the relevant aspect. 
Accordingly, firms with stable stakeholder group relations will probably encounter fewer 
difficulties attracting new equity investment to the firm (Waddock and Graves, 1997).
In general this view is borne out by prior empirical studies. Orlitzky and Benjamin find an 
overall negative correlation of 0.0965 in their meta-survey of 1968-1985.1 Even so, there is some 
variation in individual studies. Aupperle et al (1985, table 3, p.459) found a negative (-0.08) but
insignificant (p=0.25) association between market-based risk and concern for society, as measured 
by a forced choice survey instrument administered to corporate executives. Whilst risk adjusted 
return measures are helpful, they do not allow the separate interpretation of risk. As Orlitzky and 
Benjamin (2001, p.370) point out, ‘…risk must be considered in and of itself and not only as an 
adjustment factor.’ McGuire et al (1988, table 3, p.864) find a weakly significant relationship 
(p<0.1) between beta and CER when CER data is averaged over the three years (1983-85) of their 
sample and a stronger relationship in one of the years (1983). In this study the beta is a lagged 
independent variable, so that low financial risk is theorised to create the planning certainty that 
facilitates investment in CER. A similar hypothesis, this time related to general reputation, is tested 
by Fombrun and Shanley (1990, p.237), suggesting that high performance and low risk send 
positive signals to market constituents, predisposing them to make favourable assessments of their 
managerial reputations. They found a significant and negative correlation (-0.28) between the 
overall 1985 Fortune ranking (which includes CER among a total of ten variables) and systematic 
risk measured by beta (Fombrun and Shanley, 1990, table 1, p.248), although in general beta was 
insignificant when regressed as an independent variable in conjunction with others, including size, 
book to market, dividend yield and risk measured by variability in accounting returns (table 3, 
p.250). 
                                                
1 The publication dates range from 1978-1995, but the earliest data included in the meta-analysis 
dates to 1968 (Spicer, 1978a).
7Other studies have examined the impact of systematic risk on CER disclosures and found 
weak negative associations (Roberts, 1992, table 4, p.608) for US data and highly significant 
negative association for UK data (Toms, 2002, Hasseldine, Salama and Toms, 2005). These studies 
follow the approach of McGuire et al 1988, suggesting that systematic risk is a determinant of CER 
since managers in lower risk companies have access to more stable cash flows allowing them to 
make such investments (Roberts, 1992, p.604, Hasseldine et al, 2005, p.238).
In addition to these hypothesised cause and effect relations, there may be other reasons for 
an association between CER and systematic risk. Alexander and Buchholz (1978) suggest that 
investors may consider less socially responsible firms to be riskier investments because they see 
management skills at the firm as low. Spicer (1978, pp.96-97) suggests that firms with good 
pollution control records are less vulnerable to costly sanctions and therefore might enjoy lower risk 
and capital costs. These hypotheses are tested by examining the statistical association between the 
CER measure and systematic risk, and also imply that lower systematic risk might be an outcome of 
better CER management. Alexander and Buchholz (1978) also found no significant relationship
between stock market returns and corporate social performance, in this case using betas to compute 
risk adjusted returns. Spicer (1978, tables 4&6, pp.107-108) finds a negative and significant 
relationship between systematic risk and pollution control performance, but the association does not 
persist through time. Reviewing these results, Chen and Metcalf (1980, table 2, p.176), show that 
the relationship between CER and systematic risk is impacted by firm size, and although negative is 
not significant.
In summary there are several important features of the above literature. First and most 
importantly, more attention is given to CER as a dependent variable where systematic risk is an 
independent variable, sometimes lagged and often argued to be a causal factor. Conversely, only an 
association with CER is asserted where systematic risk is the dependent variable. A large panel data 
set provides the opportunity to examine these relationships in more detail. Second, where 
8systematic risk has been the explained variable, relatively few control variables such as size and 
industry grouping have been used. New tests, using a large dataset potentially overcomes problems 
associated with interpreting key co-efficients in the absence of such control variables without 
compromising required degrees of freedom. Third, the datasets upon which the literature is based is 
somewhat dated and typically considers relatively short windows. Again a longer run panel data set 
overcomes these limitations and allows some investigation of the extent to which the increasing 
policy importance of environmental reputation is impacting on firm risk. Long run tests have been 
conducted on the impact of CER on financial returns, for example, Antunovich and Laster (2000) 
employ data for the 1983-1996 period, and a complementary study of its impact on risk is therefore 
of potential value. Fourth, there was no consistent, comprehensive and objective standard for the 
measurement of CER. These have varied from self-generated measures, for example accounting 
disclosures, are difficult to objectively identify (Aupperle et al, 1985) are inevitably propagandist 
and part of the image creation process (Cochran and Wood, 1984). Alternatively, measures 
generated by external agencies, for example pollution control indices is potentially equally biased, 
for example by dealing with only one particular aspect of CER such as pollution (Bragdon and 
Marlin, 1972) or being likely to reflect opinion without reference to the technical aspects of the 
particular industry (Cochran and Wood, 1984). A useful compromise comes from surveys from 
objective observers conversant with the industry, based on the views of large numbers of managers 
and investors. These ‘Most Admired Companies’ surveys have been published annually in Fortune
since 1982 and in Management Today since 1994 for the US and the UK respectively and have been 
utilised in some of the prior studies referred to above (McGuire et al, 1998, Fombrun and Shanley, 
1990, Antunovich and Laster, 2000, Toms, 2002, Hasseldine, Salama and Toms, 2005)
As the above review of evidence has suggested, if a firm proactively engages in 
environmentally responsible actions, stakeholders will be satisfied. Supporting this view, Orlitzky 
and Benjamin (2001) summarising many of the prior studies, concluded that firms with better 
9reputations for corporate social performance are less risky. Based on this framework, we derive our 
main theoretical argument; if a firm acts (does not act) in an environmentally responsible manner, 
then this firm will decrease (increase) its market risk. This leads to our hypothesis that firm risk is 
negatively related to corporate environmental performance.
III. RESEARCH DESIGN AND HYPOTHESES
A. Reputation data
Reputation data for CER was obtained from the Management Today magazine survey for several 
reasons. First, it provides comparable data for the whole period of the study, 19940-2006. Second, 
the number of respondents provides a sufficient year by year sample size. Third, respondents, who 
consist of both managers and investment analysts specialising in that sector, rate only firms in an 
industry with which they are familiar. The sample population chosen for this study included all 
firms covered by the Management Today ‘Britain’s Most Admired Companies (MAC)’ 1994-2006 
survey in terms of ‘Community and Environmental Responsibility’.2 Each annual survey contains 
all the FTSE100 British companies and, on average, 90% of the top 200 companies by market 
capitalisation. The sample companies are the largest by market capitalisation from each of 26 
sectors. Each year Britain’s MAC survey asks senior executives from 260 British companies and 
senior specialist business analysts to give a rating of the performance of each company, other than 
their own in the case of executives, within their industrial sector. They provide a score of 0 (= poor) 
to 10 (= excellent) for each of nine characteristics that impact on the major stakeholders.3 A total of 
                                                
2 Data are available from 1992-2006, but there is no data for 1993, so we started our panel dataset in 
1994. Collection of results starts in April each year, and they are finalised in September and 
published in December, so we assume that the CER rankings are available from October each year. 
Tests of leads/lags (not reported) showed that our original assumption gave the strongest predictor 
for beta.
3 These include quality of management, financial soundness, quality of service/products, quality of 
marketing, ability to attract & retain top talent, long-term investment value, capacity to innovate, 
use of corporate assets, and community and environmental responsibility.
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3153 firm-years were listed in these surveys, with 567 individual firms represented over the years. 
The sample was reduced further due to missing accounting and return data. This leaves 1625 usable 
observations which appeared in the MAC published survey of Community and Environmental 
Responsibility from 1994 and 2006 (inclusive), and for which all appropriate data were available.
B. Other variables
The dependent variable for empirical analysis is systematic risk. This is captured by estimating a 
firm’s beta risk (BETA). In this paper, a company’s beta factor has been estimated from regressing 
monthly log stock return on the monthly log market return of the FTSE-350 over the last five years. 
Rit = αi + βiRmt + ei (1)
where:
Rit = the return on security i for month t
αi = the intercept term
βi = the systematic risk of security i (BETA)
Rmt = the return on the market for month t
ei = an error term
The beta has only been calculated if twenty-four or more company monthly returns were available 
over that period. 
The explanatory variables used in the regression analysis include the corporate 
environmental performance. This has been measured by Community and Environmental 
Responsibility (CER) rankings, as published in Management Today’s MAC survey in December 
each year. The CER variable is the average score derived from the individual ratings of executives 
and analysts combined. 
In addition, following the literature (see for instance the seminal work of Beaver et al. 
1970), we include a number of underlying firm characteristics (i.e. accounting variables) that can 
affect individual firms’ risk and which need to be controlled for in the estimations. In particular, the 
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prior empirical studies suggest that large firms are presumed to be less risky and find negative 
association between firm size and systematic risk (e.g. Alexander and Thistle, 1999; Lord and 
Beranek, 1999). Therefore, we control for corporate size (SIZE) as measured by the log of the 
number of employees. Additionally, it is often asserted that firms with low payout ratios are more 
risky (Beaver et al. 1970) and, therefore, many studies examine the dividend payout ratio as a 
determinant of systematic risk and find a significant negative association with systematic risk (e.g. 
Bowman, 1979). Hence, we control for the dividend payout (POUT), calculated by dividing 
dividends per share by the adjusted net earnings per share for the last reporting period. 
Another variable that has been frequently used in the tests of association and prediction of 
systematic risk is corporate liquidity (e.g. Ferris et al. 1990). The current ratio is widely interpreted 
as a measure of liquidity (Abdelghany, 2005). Therefore, we control for liquidity (LIQU) using
current ratio (Datastream Worldscope item 08106), as measured by total current assets / total 
current liabilities. 
Gearing is another determinant of risk. The larger the debt in the firm's capital structure, the 
higher is the risk of default, and the lower is the valuation of its equity (see for example, Baxter, 
1967; Bierman, 1968; Ben-Zion and Balch, 1973; Hamada, 1972; Ben-Zion and Shalit, 1975). 
Therefore, we control for capital gearing (GEAR) (Datastream Worldscope item 08221), as
measured by total debt as a percentage of total capital. Further, empirical studies examining the 
determinants of systematic risk have generally hypothesized and observed positive association 
between risk and asset growth (e.g. Bowman, 1979). Therefore, we control for asset growth 
(GROW), as measured by TAt / TAt-1 where TA is the book value of total assets. We also control 
for firm profitability, as measured by Return on Capital Employed (ROCE) (Datastream 
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Worldscope item 08376, Return on Invested Capital). We group our companies by industry using 
the Datastream INDC2 indicator, thereby breaking the sample into 11 high-level groups.4
C. Model specification
The model is designed to investigate whether the CER rankings add extra information to models of 
the determinants of a company’s beta (e.g. Beaver et al. 1970; Bowman, 1979; Ferris et al. 1990; 
Alexander and Thistle, 1999; Lord and Beranek, 1999; Abdelghany, 2005).5 To do so, the following 
model was estimated using random and fixed-effects regression models:6,7
BETA it = β1 CER it + β2 SIZE it + β3 POUT it + β4 LIQU it + β5 GEAR it + β6 GROW it
    + β
7 
ROCE it + β8IND it + µit (2)
Where:
i = 1, …, N;
t = 1994,…,2006;
BETA = Systematic risk as measured by the company’s beta factor;
CER = Community and Environmental Responsibility rankings, as 
published in Management Today’s MAC survey in December each year;
SIZE = Log of number of employees;
POUT = Dividend payout;
LIQU = Current ratio;
GEAR = Log of equity gearing;
GROW = Log of asset growth;
ROCE = Return on Capital Employed;
IND = Industry grouping variable
It should be noted that most of our variables are company accounts variables which are announced 
once a year. However, beta varies continuously. This mismatch means that we have to make a 
                                                
4 The groups are: basic materials (BMATR), consumer goods (CNSMG), consumer services 
(CNSMS), finance (FINAN), healthcare (HLTHC), industrials (INDUS), technology (TECNO), 
telecommunications (TELECOM), unclassified (UNCLS), unquoted equities (not an ICP-covered 
sector) (UQEQS) and utilities (UTILS).
5 We also test the impact of CER growth on beta growth.
6 Fixed-effects modelling should be used when the data represents a self-selected group. However, 
if the data represents a random draw from the population, then the researcher should use the 
random-effects modelling. Furthermore, random-effects should be used if one or more of the key 
independent variables are fixed within firms over time (Black et al. 1997).
7 In unreported tests we checked the CER could predict total risk (i.e. variance of returns) or firm-
specific risk (i.e. the risk of (firm returns minus FTSE350 returns)) instead of beta, but found no
significant predictive power. 
13
decision on the frequency of our data to be used in the regressions. We decide that, since most of 
our variables changed only annually, if we use monthly data in the regressions, we might get highly 
significant results but would be in danger of creating twelve times as much data as there really was. 
Instead, we request monthly data from Datastream, and thus the accounts data came in runs 
of twelve months, but then filter it so as only to include data when the accounts variables changed 
from the previous run of twelve months. Using this method, each data item was “fresh”, at the cost 
of losing some information on the monthly variation in betas and market values.8 All accounting 
data are assumed to be available at a lag of four months, since UK Listing Authority rules state that 
preliminary results must be released within 120 days of the company year-end. Thus, data on beta 
for e.g. April are paired with accounts data for companies with year-ends in December.
IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Descriptive statistics of the primary variables of interest are provided in Tables 1 to 4. Table 1 
(overleaf) presents descriptive statistics for each series at the company/month level (1,600 data 
items). BETA, Systematic risk as measured by the company’s beta factor; CER, Community and 
Environmental Responsibility rankings, as published   in Management Today’s MAC survey in 
December each year; SIZE, Natural logarithm of number of employees; POUT, Dividend payout; 
LIQU, Current ratio; GEAR, capital gearing; GROW, Natural logarithm of asset growth; ROCE, 
Return on Capital Employed. Natural logarithms are calculated for variables with large positive 
skewness (SIZE and GROW). Even so, several variables demonstrate the trappings of non-
normality, mainly due to the presence of outliers, indicated by the maximum and minimum 
observed values. The dependent variable, beta, is however close to normal. These data 
characteristics do not necessarily have further implications for model specification in a panel data 
context at this stage. 
                                                
8 We also tried using data every December, so that the CER data was fresh but the accounting data 
was up to 11 months old, but arrived at very similar results.
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Table 1
Descriptive statistics
BETA CER SIZE POUT LIQU GEAR GROW ROCE
Mean 0.924 5.532 9.399 47.68 1.339 35.92 0.067 12.33
Median 0.916 5.500 9.505 45.64 1.160 35.85 0.050 11.19
Std.Dev. 0.473 0.844 1.391 22.44 0.877 19.64 0.241 16.02
Min -0.800 2.700 1.792 0 0.150 0 -1.197 -128.7
Max 3.775 8.500 12.93 100.0 11.25 99.67 3.738 135.5
< 0 23 0 0 0 0 25 532 126
= 0 0 0 0 66 0 0 0 0
Table 2 (below) presents the correlations between the dependent variable and the main 
explanatory and control variables. Table 2 shows that none of the variables suffered from 
multicollinearity. In fact, the correlations are remarkably low between all our variables. Table 2 also 
shows that the highest figure is a correlation of 0.32 between CER and size. This confirms that large 
firms invest more in reputation as evidenced by the positive significant association between 
corporate size and CER, a finding which is consistent with prior studies (e.g. Chen and Metcalf, 
1980, Toms, 2002; Hasseldine et al. 2005). There is only a -0.09 direct correlation between CER 
and beta.
Table 2
Correlation analysis 
BETA CER SIZE POUT LIQU GEAR GROW ROCE
BETA 1.00 -0.09 0.03 -0.12 0.21 -0.07 0.00 -0.11
CER 1.00 0.32 0.13 -0.11 0.06 0.00 0.02
SIZE 1.00 0.10 -0.20 0.21 0.09 0.15
POUT 1.00 -0.19 0.16 -0.01 -0.06
LIQU 1.00 -0.30 -0.03 -0.01
GEAR 1.00 0.00 -0.02
GROW 1.00 0.02
ROCE 1.00
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How the mean betas and CERs vary by industry can be seen in Table 3 below. As one would 
expect, the Technology sector has very high betas and the Utilities sector very low betas. Mean 
CERS do not however vary a great deal by sector.
Table 3
Mean betas and CERs by industry
No. of company / year 
data items
Mean beta
Mean
CER
Basic materials 147 1.02 5.65
Consumer goods 279 0.80 5.51
Consumer services 466 0.88 5.26
Finance 15 0.62 4.53
Healthcare 54 0.72 6.12
Industrials 421 1.07 5.60
Technology 45 1.63 5.48
Telecommunications 27 1.25 5.68
Unclassified 2 1.20 5.64
Unquoted equities 1 0.90 5.33
Utilities 118 0.56 5.86
The mean betas and CERs for each year are shown in Table 4 (overleaf). The mean beta is 
not exactly 1.00 each year, as which companies are included in the MAC survey and which 
companies satisfy all our data criteria vary year by year. The mean CER is however remarkably 
consistent over the years, even after we drop some companies due to the non-availability of data. 
Possibly the CER scores are standardised at 5.50 by Management Today before publication.
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Table 4
Mean betas and CERs by year
No. of company / year 
data items
Mean beta
Mean
CER
1994 7 1.17 5.58
1995 159 1.05 5.48
1996 147 0.97 5.53
1997 148 0.93 5.58
1998 145 0.76 5.55
1999 131 0.94 5.75
2000 130 0.87 5.53
2001 128 0.80 5.54
2002 136 0.88 5.48
2003 143 1.02 5.54
2004 127 0.90 5.48
2005 127 0.89 5.41
2006 97 1.08 5.50
Table 5 (following) presents the regression results from the estimation of equation (1). Fixed 
effect and random effects are reported. The random effects model is preferred since beta varies 
significantly across most industry groups, from an average of 0.62 for finance to 1.63 for 
technology, and group membership is time invariant. Otherwise, it should be noted however that the 
Hausman test (p = 0.0238) favours the fixed effects model. 
Using a two tailed test, CER is significantly and negatively associated with beta in the 
random effects model, and in the fixed effects the significance threshold is at 10% rather than 5%. 
Following the literature and hypothesis stated above, using a one tailed test the significance is at the 
5% threshold for all models. If significance can be safely assumed, other things being equal, an 
improvement of 1.0 in a company’s environmental performance is associated with a 0.028 drop in 
its beta.
Other variables are also important in the regressions. The random effects model reflects the 
fact that the technology sector in particular is characterised by high betas. The year dummies have 
typically negative signs indicating that the reference year of 2006 has untypically high betas. Size is 
17
only weakly significant in both models and takes an unexpected positive sigh in the random effects 
model. Payout and ROCE are consistently and negatively significant as expected in both models.
To address the issue of the attention given in the literature to CER as a dependent variable 
and the possibility of lagged effects, further models were tested. Tests of CER with beta as an 
independent variable did not produce a significant co-efficient for beta, nor did the use of lags on
beta or CER as independent variables in either model. As these results are less significant than those 
reported in table 5, or altogether insignificant, they are not described further.  Therefore it is 
concluded that the contemporaneous relationship between CER and risk is much closer than 
considering lags of either variable.
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Table 5
Regression output
Independent
Variables
Random-effects 
GLS regression
Fixed-effects (within) 
regression
Intercept 0.940 (0.000)*** 1.786 (0.000)***
CER -0.028 (0.026)** -0.024 (0.086)*
SIZE 0.031 (0.050)* -0.053 (0.071)*
POUT -0.002 (0.000)*** -0.002 (0.003)***
LIQU 0.043 (0.046)** -0.004 (0.872)
GEAR -0.000 (0.636) -0.000 (0.995)
GROW -0.072 (0.018)** -0.072 (0.029)**
ROCE -0.003 (0.000)*** -0.003 (0.000)***
Year: 1994 0.022 (0.863) -0.043 (0.739)
Year: 1995 0.040 (0.432) 0.043 (0.450)
Year: 1996 -0.046 (0.361) -0.033 (0.557)
Year: 1997 -0.079 (0.127) -0.062 (0.271)
Year: 1998 -0.232 (0.000)*** -0.219 (0.000)***
Year: 1999 -0.078 (0.133) -0.072 (0.208)
Year: 2000 -0.173 (0.001)*** -0.166 (0.003)***
Year: 2001 -0.265 (0.000)*** -0.266 (0.000)***
Year: 2002 -0.180 (0.000)*** -0.188 (0.001)***
Year: 2003 -0.093 (0.060)* -0.108 (0.034)**
Year: 2004 -0.139 (0.006)*** -0.134 (0.010)**
Year: 2005 -0.113 (0.022)** -0.107 (0.032)**
CNSMS -0.022 (0.763)
UTILS -0.067 (0.560)
BMATR 0.282 (0.002)***
INDUS 0.152 (0.035)**
TECNO 0.849 (0.000)***
TELCM 0.370 (0.290)
FINAN -0.099 (0.377)
HLTHC -0.114 (0.366)
UNCLS 0.209 (0.080)*
UQEQS 0.134 (0.088)*
R2 0.243 (overall) 0.115 (within)
Sample size 1625 1625
Notes:
 Dependent variable, BETA. Numbers in parentheses are P-values computed using heteroscedasticity-
consistent standard errors. Significance levels (one-tailed test except intercept terms): ***p <0.01, 
**p<0.05, *p<0.10. CER, corporate environmental reputation.
 Hausman Test: P > χ218 = 0.0239
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V. CONCLUSIONS
The paper has used the largest dataset yet assembled, with all the Management Today CER scores 
from 1994-2006, and a range of accounting variables found by previous authors to be significant 
explanatory factors for firm risk. It has found evidence of a negative relationship between CER and 
beta. As is therefore perhaps to be expected, developing a good environmental reputation also 
amounts to good risk management. However, the potential benefit, whether to corporate financial
mangers or portfolio investors is quite small. Specifically, a 1.0 improvement in the CER score is 
associated with only a 0.02 decrease in a firm’s beta, once the more frequently-used accounting 
statistics are included in the regression. There is accordingly a similar scale impact in typical cost of 
capital formulations such as the capital asset pricing model. 
Although the apparent elasticity of the relationship is rather low, the findings are important 
for two specific reasons. First, they can be added to the literature that shows a positive relationship 
between CER and financial performance as a further dimension of the benefits of developing a 
reputation for environmental management. Second, as the required response to the challenge of 
climate change imposes new constraints on the corporate sector, the association is likely to become 
stronger and more elastic. At this stage, the existence of a relationship is suggestive of the 
possibility of market incentives for investment in environmental good practice which may substitute 
of complement regulatory alternatives.
Further research might examine whether this result applies in other countries (e.g. the US), 
particularly when using larger environmental performance databases. Further investigations could 
also look at individual industries: the CER-risk relationship could be much stronger for, e.g., oil 
companies than retailers. These will, however, be constrained by the limited amount of data yet 
available, since we found only 1600 useable data points across all industries.
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